A Design of Low Power NAND based Multiplexer Circuit in CMOS to DPL Converter for Smart card Security System

  IJETT-book-cover  International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT)          
© 2015 by IJETT Journal
Volume-20 Number-6
Year of Publication : 2015
Authors : Ms.S.Nagalakshmi, Ms.R.Chitra


Ms.S.Nagalakshmi, Ms.R.Chitra"A Design of Low Power NAND based Multiplexer Circuit in CMOS to DPL Converter for Smart card Security System", International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT), V20(6),283-287 Feb 2015. ISSN:2231-5381. www.ijettjournal.org. published by seventh sense research group


In the consumer market the smart cards are frequently used as cryptographic device to provide security and storage of secret information. Security issues play a major role in smart cards. Now-a-days a large amount of attacks have been developed to hack the secret information by leakage of such private data in the form of power during the processing of smart cards.These types of attacks are often referred as side channel analysis(SCA).For stealing the information,a technique called differential power analysis (DPA) attacks is used. This is a very powerful technique for stealing the secret data. To protect the information from stealing, dual-rail pre-charge logic(DPL) technique is implemented. By using DPL technique the original power cannot be hacked.


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Key words
Cryptography, Differential power analysis, Dual-rail pre-charge logic, Security, Smart card, Side-channel analysis(SCA)