Second Priced Dynamic Auction Mechanism

  IJETT-book-cover  International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT)          
  
© 2011 by IJETT Journal
Volume-1 Issue-1                          
Year of Publication : 2011
Authors :P.Deepa, V.Hemapriya , X. Arockia Nancy
 

MLA

P.Deepa, V.Hemapriya , X. Arockia Nancy. "Second Priced Dynamic Auction Mechanism". International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT),V1(1):68-72 May to June 2011.ISSN:2231-5381.www.ijettjournal.org. Published by Seventh Sense Research Group.

Abstract— A dynamic auction me chanism to solve the allocation problem of computation capacity in the environment of cloud computing is proposed here. Continuous Double Auction (CDA) me chanism is proposed where resources are considered as provider agents and users as consumer agents. Auctioneer fixes the amount of products based on the products name and demand but bidders will bid the amount based on the need of the product and the time allotted to bid. Truth - telling property holds when a second - priced auction mechanism is applied into the resource allocation problem. Thus, the cloud service provider (CSP) can assure reasonable profit and efficient allocation of its computation resources

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